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TORTS-CONSENT AS A DEFENSE IN CIVIL ACTIONS ARIS-
ING OUT OF MUTUAL AFFRAYS, THE KENTUCKY RULE.
This note deals only with actions arising out of mutual combats,
and does not purport to include those involving fights between the
parties where one is the aggressor and the other defends himself,
even though in defending himself he becomes the aggressor.
Generally speaking, if an individual conseuts to an injury to
himself by another, that consent, when given by a capable person,
bars any recovery by the injured party in a civil action for damages.!
The familiar, long established maxim, volenti non fit n2urza, ordi-
narily operates to deny relief to the complainant.
However, where two or more parties voluntarily engage in a
mutual combat in anger, two divergent viewpoints on the question
of whether consent to fight defeats a civil action for damages have
been adopted. England and a majority of the states which have
faced the issue hold that consent to fight is no defense, and each
may recover from the other for all injuries incurred in the fight.
A small, but well-reasoned minority view is that the act of each 3s
unlawful, and relief will be denied both in a civil action in the
absence of force exceeding the consent given.
2
Kentucky, now a staunch member of the minority, first evinced
a bit of credence in that idea by dictum appearing in a case' of as-
sault and battery. There, the court, although it reversed a judgment
for the plaintiff on other grounds, stated that it deemed it not un-
proper to add a statement of the applicable jury instructions.
Among the proposed instructions is:
"If defendants used more force than was neces-
sary, or than reasonably appeared to them to be neces-
sary under the circumstances and surroundings, to
to save themselves from an assault then about to
be inflicted on them by plaintiff the defendants
are liable to plaintiff therefor, although they were act-
ing in their self-defense or under apparent necessity,
as defined in the instructions."'
True, this cannot be dogmatically stated to be a direct approbation
of the present minority view, as the court failed to speak of consent
1 PROSSER, TORTS sec. 18 (1941), 4 Am. Jua. sec. 83 p. 172; 6 C.J.
see. 16 p. 805.
2PRossEn, TORTS sec. 18 (1941), see notes, 6 A.L.R. 388 (1920),
30 A.L.R. 199 (1924), 47 A.L.R. 1092 (1927), 4 Am. JuR. sec. 84 p.
173.
, PRosSER, TORTS sec. 18 (1941), see notes, 6 A.L.R. 388, 393
(1920), 30 A.L.R. 199 (1924), 4 AM. JUR. sec. 85 p. 174.
'See Beavers v. Bowen, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 291, 293-294, 80 S.W
1165, 1167 (1904).
'Ibid.
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throughout the opinion, but, it might be reasonably inferred from
the court's proposition that unless the defendant had used more force
than was reasonably necessary, the plaintiff could not recover.
The court removed all existing doubt as to its position on the
issue seven years later when, without qualification, it sanctioned
the minority view' There, the parties, whose lifelong friendship had
suddenly ceased because of difficulties arising out of the courtship of
the son of one and the daughter of the other, opened their krnves
and proceeded to whittle away at each other. The plaintiff received
a severe cut near the heart and the defendant was marked on one
leg in the ensuing battle. In an action for assault and battery, the
defendant pleaded self-defense and filed a counter claim for damages
for his injuries. The court, after stating that consent to engage in a
mutual combat would not be available to either as a defense to a
criunal prosecution, affirmed a judgment denying relief to either
party. After citing other authorities, among them, Galbraith v.
Flemng, the court said:
"In Goldnamer v. O'Brien, 98 Ky. 569, 33 S.W 831,
17 Ky Law Rep. 1386, 36 L.R.A. 715, 56 Am. St. Rep.
378, this court after referring to the conflict of authority
on the question said: 'While we readily appreciate the
argument that, so far as the state is concerned, no con-
sent can be pleaded in justification, we have not been
able to understand how in a civil suit, in which the
party consenting alone is interested, compensation can
be allowed by the law. If both parties to the action are
violators of the law, must the mouth of one be closed,
and the complaint of the other heard? The parties
stand on an exact equality before the law, and, if one
wrongfully consented to beat another, the other as
wrongfully consented to be beaten.' ""
The court, not content to rest upon precedent alone, proceeded:
" we do not see why in a civil action the rule
should not apply that the law will refuse relief or an
award of damages to him who voluntarily engages in
a thing forbidden by law. The fight being unlawful,
and both being equally to blame for the fight, it is
'Lykins v Hamrick, 144 Ky 80, 137 S.W 852 (1911).
60 Mich. 403, 27 N.W 581 (1886) This is probably the leading
case for the minority view. There, in approving the instructions of
the lower court, the court said: " if the plaintiff voluntarily en-
gaged in the fight in the first instance for the sake of fighting, and
not as a means of self-defense, he could not recover unless the de-
fendant beat him excessively or unreasonably. This was as favorable
to the plaintiff as the law will admit. The law does not put a pre-
mium upon fighting, and one who voluntarily enters into a quarrel
will not be afforded relief for his own wrong in damages if he comes
out second best. While the voluntary act on the part of the plaintiff
would not preclude the state from pumshing him or the defendant
for a breach of the peace, it nevertheless prevents him from bring-
ing a civil action to recover compensation for injuries received by
his own seeking, and in violation of the law."
'Lykins v Hamrick, 144 Ky. 80, 83, 137 S.W 852, 853 (1911).
STUDENT NoTEs AND COMMENTS 171
hard to see upon what principle the law should in a
civil action make a settlement between wrongdoers. It
is a wise rule of the law to leave the wrongdoer where
it finds him, and it seems to us that the rule applies
equally to violations of the law by fighting as to other
violations."'
In 1923, the court, by dictum, reaffirmed its position when it
stated that the following instruction given by the lower court was
correct: '"
if it believes from the evidence that at the
time and on the occasion of the difficulty described in
the evidence, plaintiff, Choate, and Charlie McNeil
[defendant] each voluntarily and mutually entered
into said conflict and difficulty, then the law is for the
defendant, and the jury will so find."'
Legal writers have traced the majority rule to what is com-
monly accepted as its embryo in an early English case." That de-
cision may have been somewhat justified at that time by a prevail-
ing idea of the need for the protection of the interests of the crown
from invasion by combatants who were guilty of a breach of the
peace. However, if one were angered sufficiently to fight, it is
rather difficult to believe that he would stop and consider that he
would be required to respond in damages for any injuries inflicted
on his opponent. This has become trite, no doubt, and serves but
slightly, if at all, as a deterrent to prospective duelists. Yet it seems
to be the public policy argument on wich the majority of the
states appear content to rest their decisions. The cliche that times
change and so do ideas might be dusted off and quite appositely
submitted to the majority, for few of us would make such a naive
contention that we would, in a fit of anger, stop and consider the
element of damages and refrain from fighting because of such.
While the ratiocination of the majority proceeds upon the theory
that the consent to fight is unlawful, and, therefore, not available
to either as a defense, the minority has advanced one step further
and called- the fighting itself unlawful.1 As fighting is an unlawful
breach of the peace, the view of the minority and of Kentucky is to
deny relief to one who voluntarily engages in a thing forbidden by
the law, where both parties are equally to blame. Kentucky has in-
"Ibid. at p. 83-84, 137 S.W 852, 854.
'9 See McNeil v. Choate, 197 Ky. 682, 683, 247 S.W 955 (1923).
Ibid.
'-PROSSER, TORTS sec. 18 (1941), Bohlen, Consent as Affecting
Civil Liability for Breaches of the Peace, 24 COL. L. REV. 819, 825-826
(1924), Note, 73 U. OF PA. L. REV. 74, 77 (1924). This case referred to
here is Matthews v. Ollerton, 1693, Comb. 218.
'' For a typical rationalization of the minority view see note 7,
supra.
For a typical rationalization of the majority view see Willey v.
Carpenter, 64 Vt. 213, 23 Atl. 630 (1892).
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timated 4 and other states' have held that if the consent given be
exceeded, then the guilty party must respond in damages for the
excessive force. The minority prefers to leave the wrongdoer where
found, and abhors the thought of compensating a party for the com-
mission of an unlawful act. In a civil suit, only the parties them-
selves are interested, and it seems contrary to sound principles of
jurisprudence to reward a party because he is the less skillful pugil-
ist and comes out of a mutual affray after absorbing a few more
well-placed blows than he is able to land on his opponent. The
minority regards the whole affair as tainted with unlawfulness and,
in a civil action, refuses relief to either participant, unless the con-
sent given be exceeded.
It might be suggested to the majority that it is doubtful whether
it is common knowledge among laymen that they can or cannot be
held civilly liable for fighting in their particular locale, until the
conclusion of a suit. If so, how can the possibility of civil damages
discourage members of the public from fighting? Although the ma-
jority would vigorously deny any inference of such result, it, in ef-
fect, under its thin cloak of deterrence, might, in some :nstances,
be said to place a premium upon wrongdoing. To clarify this premise,
if a party voluntarily enters a fight, he is guilty of a breach of the
peace, and therefore, a wrongdoer. But, even if he should discover,
to his momentary dismay, some latent talent for fisticuffs in his op-
ponent, he may, notwithstanding his wrongful act, collect as much
or more than his skilled adversary in a subsequent civil action.
Kentucky, by unequivocally adopting the minority view in the
Lykins case,' reached what is considered by legal writers as the
preferred result, although the Kentucky precedent is somewhat
novel and unique. No other member state of the minority has relied
on an abortion case in which consent defeated recovery in a civil
action, True, perhaps the leading case is cited and serves as ample
precedent for those devoted to stare decisss. Generally speaking,
however, an abortion is probably more distasteful to the ordinary
individual and it usually carries a heavier sentence than fighting at
criminal law. Therefore, a distinction might well be made between
the effect of consent in civil actions based on abortions and in those
based on mutual affrays, as probably no court would hold that con-
sent would be a defense to a civil action for the taking of a life.
This writer has neither the intent nor desire to mmunize the
importance which the law does and should attach to the public
peace as well as to the life and person of the citizen; but, the pro-
tection of these paramount principles should and does primarily lie
1See note 4, supra.
'See note, 6 A.L.R. 388, 391 (1920).
'See note 6, supra.
1The case referred to here is Galbraith v Fleming, 60 Mich.
403, 27 N.W 581 (1886).
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within the criminal law field. From it should come any protective
remedies if the present ones are found inadequate or too lax. A de-
tailed discussion of this problem would bring to the fore the problem
of the function of the civil law. Is it used to supplement and aid the
criminal law, or is it a separate branch designed to cure the ills in
a field all its own? The minority would seem to indicate that they
consider each as designed to care for its own particular problems,
and the civil side maintains a laissez faire attitude toward supple-
menting the criminal law, at least as to this particular problem.
A comparison of the rules suggests that although the funda-
mental principles relied on by the two types of jurisdictions are so
opposed as to appear irreconcilable, the final result from a pecuniary
standpoint may be similar, as some of the states of the majority side
permit the introduction of evidence of mutual consent in mitigation
of damages,' and some, if not all, of the minority recognize the
principle that if the consent given be exceeded, the guilty party is
liable for such force as is determined to be excessive by a jury"
Thus, where the parties fight in anger by mutual consent, if the con-
sent is not exceeded, the majority permits both parties to recover
for all injuries received and the minority denies recovery of any-
thing to either. Following this further, where the consent is ex-
ceeded, the minority would allow the party on whom the excessive
force was used to recover for the excessive force, and the majority
would doubtlessly also permit him a greater recovery than his ad-
versary, although he would still have to pay for whatever injuries he
might be responsible for causing to the other. Hence, the final pe-
cumary results are not so far apart as one would surmise at a fleet-
ing glance. It is simply the idea of a civil court of law occupying its
valuable time by effecting settlements between evildoers, equally
in the wrong, which detracts from the dignity and true purpose
of civil jurisprudence. Broadly speaking, the true aim of civil juris-
prudence is to render equal justice to the litigating parties, and
this can be aptly achieved by leaving equal wrongdoers where
found.
In conclusion, considering the problem from the viewpoint of
the parties to the action, it probably matters little which rule is
adopted, as the final results are not so distingushable as to arouse
any great concern. This may serve as an answer to the apparently
immovable conflict of authority. If the object of the complainant be
pecuniary in nature, he would probably find himself in practically
the same shape in both jurisdictions. If his primary aim be the as-
suagement of his ego through nominal damages, it still matters little
which rule is adopted as neither side would deny that both are
wrongdoers. Neither rule will, as has been previously suggested, act
as a deterrent to fighting and thereby protect the public's interest
' See note, 6 A.L.R. 394 (1920).
' See note, 6 A.L.R. 388, 393-395 (1920).
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more than the other. But, considering the problem from the court's
viewpoint, the process of going to trial will usually involve more
costs and time than disnssing the case without ever submitting it
to a jury. If for no other reason than to rid the courts of the de-
grading task of effecting petty settlements among wrongdoers, it is
submitted that this is ample reason to deny relief to either party.
GLADNEY HARVILLE
